Ecuador: new laws, new conflicts

Carlos Alberto Montaner

It is very likely that the Ecuadoreans will approve a new Constitution on Sept. 28. It will be the twentieth in that country's turbulent history. Like good Latin Americans, they have a peculiar compulsion to write Constitutions that later nobody obeys. To come up with the new text, President Rafael Correa, aided by his comrades, repeatedly broke the laws by which they had been elected. That's nothing new in that country. Almost all the previous rulers took similar measures. In Latin America, nobody understands that a lawful state can function adequately and be most fruitful only if everyone submits to the rule of law. The success of nations depends on the civic quality of its citizens, not of the Constitution under which (theoretically) they decide to take shelter.

President Rafael Correa has made every effort to win that referendum. He has made deals left and right, has handed out juicy subsidies, and has not hesitated to confront the Church to achieve his designs. Why? That's obvious: he intends to strengthen his power. He is convinced that he is the providential man who will save Ecuador from its constant institutional disorder, corruption, relative poverty and dependence on foreign nations. He is a leader who is sure of himself. Knows neither fear nor doubt. And how is he going to save Ecuador? He wants to be reelected at once, control the currently autonomous Central Bank, and be empowered to govern by decree if the legislators do not obey him diligently. Among his new powers will be the ability to dissolve Parliament. He aspires to be a centralist, strong president who will place regional administrations under the authority of Quito. His bête noire is Jaime Nebot, the very popular mayor of Guayaquil, the only area of the country where the Constitution might be rejected, something that surely will trigger a dangerous conflict.

The chances that Correa's plans will succeed are quite remote. One of Ecuador's biggest problems is the minimal participation of the public sector. The more resources and responsibilities that are given to the state, the worse the results, the more the corruption, and the faster the technological backwardness will be. Nor does it seem advisable to reprise the old ECLAlian superstitions of tariff protectionism, the substitution of imports and the use of public funds to stimulate growth or generate equity through the distribution of subsidies. That "developmentism" failed almost half a century ago and nobody -- not even ECLA, the Economic Commission for Latin America, or anyone who is minimally informed -- today defends it.

But perhaps where President Correa is most misguided is in his choice of friends and enemies. To line up behind the flag of Chavism is a blunder. Chávez is a tragic clown, bulging with petrodollars, who is doing something as dangerous as trying to revive the spirit of the Cold War by urging Russians and Iranians to confront the United States and the West on Latin American soil. What benefit can Ecuador achieve from such a conflict? Correa's hostility toward Colombia makes no sense, either. What's best for Ecuador is the defeat of the FARC, the ELN, the paramilitaries and the drug cartels. President Uribe is accomplishing that thankless task. If he fails, the Ecuadoreans and the entire region will end up paying for the damages. Whose idea is it that Ecuador can be neutral in an argument whose outcome will deeply affect it? Isn't it evident that what Ecuador should desire is for its closest neighbor to be at peace, so the narcoguerrillas won't cross the border and Colombia can be a prosperous, tranquil country whose farmers won't have to emigrate?

In any case, what will happen after the new Constitution is approved? President Correa undoubtedly will interpret the results as a kind of general approval of his ideas and the country will suffer the consequences. In the economic field, we shall witness a flight of capital, a paralysis of investments, and increased unemployment. Because in the new Constitution all the economic strings are in the hands of the Chief Executive, the crisis will come when he proposes an end to dollarization and a return to a new and weak (but gloriously nationalistic) sucre. In the political field, there will be a sharpening of the clashes between Guayaquil, which demands autonomy, and Correa, who will refuse to grant it. In the international arena, more friction with the United States and Colombia, and fewer foreign investments. In sum, the old objective of pluriparty democracy -- to elect rulers so they may solve problems -- will be thwarted once again. Mr. Correa is intent on creating problems.

He has a special talent to unleash storms.