Cuba and the democratic
opposition
Carlos Alberto Montaner
Cuba, two
perspectives: The European Union and Cubans
Association of Ibero-Americans for Freedom
Casa de América, Madrid, Feb. 3, 2009
The Association of Ibero-Americans
for Freedom, presided by Dr. Antonio Guedes, has asked me to share with you
some reflections about the Cuban democratic opposition. I accept the
challenge but begin by saying that I cannot speak on behalf of the dozens of
organizations that, inside and outside the island, have their points of view
and strategies, as befits a complex society with a certain degree of
sophistication, although I believe I maintain excellent relations with most
of their leaders. Therefore, my opinions should be accepted only as the
personal criteria of someone who, for the past several decades, has not
ceased to pay attention and give aid to those groups intent on achieving the
establishment in Cuba of a pluralistic political regime that respects
individual freedoms and human rights.
In any case, this seems to me to be an extremely important topic, given that
the Cuban dictatorship, as part of its strategy of immobility, insists on
picturing the opposition as a pitiful gang of fascists at the service of the
United States, for the purpose of demonstrating that there is no better
option to the communist government and that the Cubans on the island do not
want it. Such statements run headlong against reality. The truth is that,
within the democratic opposition, one can find all the factors of knowledge,
moderation and common sense that will contribute very constructively to the
transition to freedom.
The revolutionary tradition
An inevitable observation ab initio is that the experience of half a century
of communist dictatorship has totally changed the political behavior of the
Cuban opposition. During the 57 years of our short republican experience,
from the establishment of an independent state in 1902 until the collapse of
the Batista dictatorship on Jan. 1, 1959, Cubans resorted to violence to
solve their political crises or impose the will of the caudillos. This
pushed us into abortive civil wars in 1906, 1912 and 1917, to the revolution
of 1933, the military coup of 1952, and finally to the triumph of the
revolution in 1959, with Fidel Castro as the country's "Maximum Leader," a
title with which he was unctuously baptized at the time.
That tradition of violence continued during the early years of Castroism,
when the opposition, through inertia and habit, attempted to halt the
enthronement of the communist dictatorship by resorting to the conventional
means of struggle that society used to practice and with which it had just
liquidated Batista: armed landings, such as the one at Bay of Pigs in 1961;
guerrilla uprisings, such as those on the Escambray mountain range (1961 to
1966); military conspiracies, sabotage and terrorist acts. None of this was
surprising for the Cubans, given that a good many leaders of the struggle
against communism were veterans of the war against Batista: Huber Matos,
Manuel Artime, Humberto Sorí Marín, Manuel Ray, David Salvador, Porfirio
Remberto Ramírez, Aldo Vera and a very long etcetera [2] that might include
dozens of notable personalities who directed the early confrontations
against Castroism.
This violent effort to forcibly replace the dominant elite (which, it must
be said, left absolutely no space for civic struggle) lasted until
approximately 1966, when the last foci of peasant guerrillas on the central
mountains were exterminated. During that period, the government efficiently
mounted an enormous repressive apparatus, a carbon copy of the Soviet model,
which made it practically impossible for its enemies to turn to armed
resistance for the purpose of overthrowing it.
A change in vision and behavior
During the following decade, under the distant influence of the civil-rights
struggle in the United States and the peaceful resistance of dissidents in
communist Europe, a slow ideological and strategic evolution began in the
ranks of the Cuban democratic opposition, which came to a notable turning
point: the rise to power in Washington of President Jimmy Carter and his
defense of human rights as the banner of U.S. foreign policy, in the spirit
of the Helsinki Accords signed in the mid-1970s.
That pacifist and rational atmosphere, which rejected violence and
vindicated democratic methods, led some oppositionists to realize that
perhaps it was a historic error for Cubans to resort to force to try to
solve their political crises. It might have been more sensible, they thought,
to follow the road of negotiation and the search for mechanisms of consensus
that might save the institutions from the shoals without the need to
periodically topple the republican structures.
Finally, in 1976, half a dozen Cuban oppositionists with leftist backgrounds
were summoned by professor Ricardo Bofill [3] and founded in Havana the
Cuban Committee for Human Rights, the first political organization in the
nation's history to expressly renounce violence as a method of struggle. The
group decided to abide by the rule of law to reclaim the rights quashed by
the dictatorship. Meanwhile, in exile in Washington, about the same time,
Mrs. Elena Mederos, former minister in the revolutionary government, and
activist and politologist Frank Calzón, founded Of Human Rights with the
same objective: to defend, by peaceful and legal means, persecuted
individuals, dissidents and political prisoners in Cuba.
That aggiornamento of the Cuban democratic opposition, which put it in step
with the major civic-struggle movements that existed worldwide, had as a
corollary another predictable evolution: the opposition began to move closer
to the paradigms and political discourses of the main ideological currents
that spread through the contemporary world, somehow evading the
autochthonous political roots and the harmful dichotomy of "revolutionaries
and counter-revolutionaries."
Precisely in Madrid in 1990, a few short months after the toppling of the
Berlin Wall, three political groups of exiles with some internal
ramifications, steeped in a civic spirit and internationally linked to their
respective party families, created the Cuban Democratic Platform [4] to try
to propitiate a peaceful change to democracy. Shortly thereafter, this new
ideological vision of political struggle began to propagate inside the
island.
An opposition similar to that in the rest of democratic world
In fact, the Cubans who today live in Cuba or abroad, display all the
ideological hues that one might find in the parliaments of any Western
country, except that the Cubans on the island must endure the constant
harassment of the political police, while the exiles can defend their ideas
without any fear. Roughly speaking, the current opposition has an abundance
of Christian democrats, social democrats, liberals and conservatives. There
are Green oppositionists, who are very concerned by the environmental
destruction seen in their country; there are oppositionists who are deeply
committed to the protection of respect for human rights, and there are union-minded
oppositionists who vindicate the rights granted to workers.
Which of these tendencies is the most powerful? It may be futile to
speculate on this issue. More than true political parties, what exists
inside and outside Cuba are currents of opinion and some small structural
streams that will eventually evolve into true, multitudinous political
formations. In addition, these tendencies have effected a certain
international linkage with similar parties and ideological institutions, the
so-called "internationals," which helps develop clear ideological paradigms
and public-policy recipes that are perfectly reasonable. All this will
somehow guarantee the foreseeable evolution of post-Castroism.
This observation is very interesting because it belies the theory that the
end of the communist dictatorship will lead to great political and economic
chaos. That's not true. Most probably, the same theoretical schemes we saw
in the countries that abandoned communism in eastern Europe will be
reproduced in Cuba. The lectures and debates so common among opposition
democrats point in that direction: they not only want to spur the end of
communism but also have a very clear idea of the direction in which the
country should move in a peaceful manner. Practically all of them think of a
political model characterized by pluralism, tolerance, alternation in power,
and subordination to the rules. What has disappeared from the Cubans'
ideological mindset are veneration for caudillos and the cult of revolution.
The frozen regime
Lamentably, the healthy evolution undergone by the democratic opposition is
not present in the behavior of the dictatorship. Over and again, the
government of the Castro brothers reiterates the hard line of the early days
of the revolution, as if the world had become frozen in the schemes of the
Cold War. As far as the ruling cupola is concerned, the Berlin Wall was
never toppled, Marxism-Leninism remains in effect, and the entire propaganda
efforts of its huge disinformation machine (endowed with the obscene
language of the rankest Stalinist lineage) insists on picturing the
democratic opposition as an artificial appendix created by the United
States, and opposition leaders as "the Miami mafia," composed of terrorist
gangs in the service of the CIA.
Nevertheless, there is very clear evidence that, under the surface, the
attitude that really prevails among government supporters, many of them in
the ruling class, totally diverges from the official line. In this regard,
the recent statements made by singer-composer Pablo Milanés [5] to a Spanish
newspaper, as interpreted by the finest experts in the intricacies of Cuban
society and the doublespeak used in Cuba, [6] constitute a lot more than an
isolated opinion; they represent the point of view of a huge majority of the
Cuban Communist Party, whose most important segment acknowledges -- to
varying degrees -- what we might call a "willingness to reform." Among many
of them, that attitude does not exclude political pluralism and an end to
Marxist-Leninist collectivism, as shown by a survey [7] done last November
by the party at the University of Havana, but never published. The survey
revealed that only 8 percent of all professors and barely 22 percent of the
students espouse the orthodox point of view propounded by Fidel and Raúl
Castro.
The end of an era
How will the Cuban dictatorship end? Probably the way it happened in several
countries that managed to orderly bury their old and obsolete dictatorships:
through a reform inside the very structure of power, a reform that quickly
and gradually will broaden the channels of societal participation, until the
old regime is peacefully dismantled through various democratic procedures.
That's what happened in Spain, Hungary, Poland and most communist countries
in eastern Europe. There is a high probability that something similar will
occur in Cuba.
When? The first step will be the burial of Fidel Castro, the true obstacle
to any symptom of sensibility and common sense. The second will come with
the enactment of the reformist moves that will presumably be advocated by
Raúl Castro at the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party, scheduled for the
second half of 2009. [8] The third will come when the democratic opposition
can begin to act with greater freedom inside the country. From that time on,
it is very likely that events will precipitate in ways that today are
unpredictable but that will eventually fling the dictatorship into the
dustbin of history. What seems unquestionable is the fact that Cuba can no
longer remain a Marxist-Leninist exception in an era when that option was
totally forsaken as a consequence of its errors, abuses and legendary
unproductivity.
The same, or something very similar, will happen in Cuba. And when we do a
balance sheet on the effects of this nigh-eternal nightmare, we might come
to the conclusion that so much sacrifice has brought us an unexpected gain:
we Cubans have learned that revolutionary violence, caudillism and
intolerance always lead to the worst of all possible fates. Fortunately, the
time to rectify these nefarious behaviors is close at hand.
NOTES
1. Carlos
Alberto Montaner is a writer and journalist. He is president of the Cuban
Liberal Union and vice president of the Liberal International. He has
published some 25 books and hundreds of articles. His latest title, released
in 2008, is “Cuba: The battle of ideas.”
2. Dr.
Huber Matos (teacher and commander in the Sierra Maestra campaign); Dr.
Manuel Artime (physician and lieutenant in Sierra Maestra; later, civilian
chief of the Brigade 2506 expeditionists who landed in Bay of Pigs);
Humberto Sorí Marín (lawyer and commander in Sierra Maestra, author of the
text of the first agrarian reform carried out by the revolution; he was
executed by firing squad in April 1961); Manuel Ray (engineer and Minister
of Public Works in the first revolutionary Cabinet; chief of Civic
Resistance, an organization in the service of the 26 July Movement; later,
creator of the People’s Revolutionary Movement, which opposed communist
dictatorship); David Salvador (labor leader of the 26 July Movement and,
after the triumph of the revolution, Secretary General of the Federation of
Cuban Workers; when he turned against communism, he created the 30 November
Movement); Porfirio Ramírez (student leader and captain in the rebel army
during the struggle against Batista; he led the Federation of University
Students in Las Villas before being executed by the government in 1960);
Aldo Vera Serafín (police commander in Havana after the triumph of the
revolution; former chief of Action and Sabotage in Havana. He was
assassinated in Puerto Rico in 1976 by the Cuban intelligence services.)
3. Bofill
had been a member of the Communist Party but had landed in prison after a
trial called “the microfraction,” accused of conspiring to limit the
authority of Castro supporters.
The
other five members were Adolfo Rivero Caro, Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz,
Edmigio López Castillo, Enrique Hernández Méndez and Dr. Marta Frayde.
A short
while later, the group was joined by brothers Gustavo and Sebastián Arcos,
prestigious figures in the struggle against Batista. All of them were
sentenced to long prison terms.
4. The
three political groups that formed the Cuban Democratic Platform were the
Christian Democratic Party (linked to the Christian Democratic International),
represented by its president, José Ignacio Rasco; the Social Democratic
Coordinator (with some incipient links to the Socialist International),
represented by Enrique Baloyra; and the Cuban Liberal Union, a member of the
Liberal International, headed by Carlos Alberto Montaner. Other, non-political
groups were also present at the event.
5. See
Público.es, Dec. 29, 2008, (http://www.publico.es/culturas/186756/socialismo/cubano/estancado),
an interview done by journalist Carlos Fuentes. In it, Pablo Milanés not
only criticizes the government openly but also declares his total mistrust
of the gerontocracy that rules the country.
6. A few
months after Milanés’ statements, the so-called “war of the e-mails” broke
out. A group of writers and artists who belonged to the Union of Writers and
Artists of Cuba (UNEAC) utilized the Internet to harshly reproach two former
functionaries in the culture sector – Luis Pavón and Jorge “Papito” Serguera
– for their cruelly repressive acts during the so-called “Gray Quinquennium”
in the first half of the 1970s. In reality, the rebuke was a shot fired in
the air to complain about the current situation without running great risk,
because the desire for deep changes felt by the intellectuals is practically
unanimous.
7. The
results of the survey remain unpublished but have been learned abroad thanks
to the cooperation of European embassies accredited in Havana. As
interesting as the overwhelming number of reformers who express their
disconformity with the system is the fact that most of them are not
satisfied with reforming the regime -- they believe in the need for a
radical change in the system.
8. In the
extended discussions prior to that long-awaited Congress (the last one was
held in 1997 and culminated in enormous frustration), the criticism against
the government and the clumsiness of the public administration has been
copious and has been heard throughout the island.
February 6, 2009
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