Why U.S. changed its position

Carlos Alberto Montaner

Hondurans are anxious to know what will happen in their country after the Nov. 29 elections. Consequently, a very alert segment of civil society, almost all of them dynamic young people, supported by the magazine Strategy and Business, organized an international seminar on Nov. 12 to examine in depth this bedeviled affair. I participated in the event, but, on my own, because I wanted to satisfy a different curiosity. I'll explain that later.

Guatemalan Julio Ligorría, an expert in crisis-solving, was asked for an analysis of how and why the international perception of the government of President Roberto Micheletti had been so negative, even though Manuel Zelaya's removal had resulted from the application of a national law. Ligorría was also asked what could be done to straighten out the mess.

Peruvian Alvaro Vargas Llosa, the author of a couple of essential books on how to emerge from underdevelopment, was asked for a futuristic vision of what it would take for Honduras to stop being the third most stubbornly poor country in Latin America, a country where 73 percent of the population survives precariously within the boundaries of poverty.

From me, they expected a prediction on what would be a violent response from the Castro-Chávez bloc to the legitimate government that will emerge from the ballot boxes, to which I added an uncomfortable final warning: This may be the last opportunity for Honduras to save individual freedoms and the republican structure.

If the Honduran people don't see in democracy and pluralism a solution to the interests of the huge majority, it is probable that on the next opportunity they will be wooed by the siren song of some demagogue of the ``Bolivarian'' ilk, dripping Venezuelan petrodollars.

Moreover, aside from my disagreeable task as Cassandra, I wanted to find out why the United States had made a 180-degree turn during the Honduran crisis and -- after asking for the immediate restitution of former President Zelaya -- had proceeded on Oct. 30 to support any decision the Honduran Congress and Supreme Court might make, which inevitably meant that the ousted president would not again occupy Government House.

There are five reasons for this radical change:

• The State Department ascertained that institutional support in Honduras for the removal and arrest of Zelaya was practically unanimous and remained firm, despite the sanctions and the cancellation of visas. The legislative and judicial branches, the churches, the army and, according to polls, 80 percent of the population preferred to see Zelaya away from power.

• The report from the legal department of the Library of Congress about Zelaya's removal, requested by a legislator, left no margin for doubt: Zelaya had been separated from his post and replaced by Micheletti in accordance with Honduran legislation. To expel him from the country surely was illegal (perhaps they might have put him in jail) but to demand his restitution was tantamount to asking Hondurans to break the law.

• The new government of Honduras had skillfully transferred the debate to the bosom of U.S. society through Republican representatives and senators, and the Obama administration was paying a political price at home for maintaining an antidemocratic stance that was contrary to the interests and values of the American people.

• Circulating through the State Department were two pages compiled by U.S. intelligence that listed the purported crimes and complicities of Zelaya's most intimate entourage with drug trafficking and corruption. It made no sense for Washington to join that side while it maintained in Honduras the Palmerola military base, which presumably was dedicated to watching and combatting activities akin to those of the relatives and friends of its controversial protégé.

• Nor did it make sense to give artificial life-support to a regime that openly militated in the camp of Hugo Chávez, a political family allied with Iran. By associating with Iran and supporting Teheran in its development of nuclear weapons, Chávez, who until recently was classified as a colorful nuisance, became a dangerous enemy.

This lucid analysis also explains the support given to the Micheletti government by the Liberal International and its president, the prestigious Dutch Eurodeputy Hans Van Baalen, as well as the deployment of observers to the next elections by several institutions in the democratic world. What's probable, then, is that the next president of Honduras will soon repair his country's international relations. Let's hope so.

November 25, 2009

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